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A final point: Thompson takes an interesting position on the rise of black 
political power in the city. She argues that this is a good thing; she urges us to 
see that blacks never before had the power that came with Coleman Young and 
other city leadcrs. Yet one can also argue that black political power in Detroit 
was more symbolic than real. Is black control of a city that was only a shadow 
of its former self, a city laid waste by years of capital flight, worth great pride 
or praise? One might claim that African Americans took power at the worst pos- 
sible moment, when memories of former glory were still fresh, but the trajec- 
tory of economic decline was well underway, and the new black leadership 
could be hit with much of the blame. Regardless of how one comes down on 
this question, Thompson's work is valuable for forcing us to think in fresh ways 
about this tragic story. 
John D. Skrentny 
University of California-San Diego 
Mark A. Lause, The Civil Wark Last Campaign: James B. Weaver, The 
Greenback-Labor Party, and the Politics of Race and Section (Lanham, 
Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 2001). 
A troublesome aspect of U.S. history for Marxian analysis is America's failure 
to turn to socialism during the industrial surge of the late nineteenth century. 
Even the search for viable radical insurgencies during that period has borne lit- 
tle fruit, except for a Populist moment in the 1890s. And agrarian radicalism 
diverged from the working class upheaval called for in Marxist dogma. Lause 
re-examines the empirical record and finds a precedent actually existed prior to 
Populism. The Gilded Age did spawn class struggle, which produced a 
Greenback-Labor Party in 1880. Although the third party polled few votes, its 
very existence, according to Lause, indicates a dialectic was operative. The fact 
that the new organization was stillborn was not due to lack of potential mass 
opposition to plutocracy. Lause argues overt political repression preserved the 
two-party monopoly on public power. 
Lause's interpretation is not intended to supplant other scholarship, but his 
thesis does, in fact, challenge at least the emphasis of much earlier historiogra- 
phy. Most historians locate the G.L.P. within a model stressing entrenched par- 
tisanship, continuity across time, the centrality of national debates on currency 
reform, and the ebb and flow of other "greenback" parties both before and after 
1880. From this perspective, the "soft" money issue was primarily an intra- 
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mural Democratic dispute. Third parties did not seek permanent independence, 
but tried to weaken major parties in order to win concessions. As part of that 
process, the G.L.P. contributed indirectly to Democratic-Populist fusion in the 
1890s and ultimate abandonment of the Gold Standard under Wilsonian 
Democracy. To forestall bolts, the two party system adjusted and reformed 
itself while preserving social order amidst prosperity. Interest-group politics, 
under the stewardship of educated experts, had worked. 
Lause rejects this scenario as a myth that re-interprets history to suit par- 
tisan agendas. The author claims the G.L.P. was radical in its personnel and pro- 
gram, and had little in common with third parties that sought fusion. The 
G.L.P., in his view, was not a progenitor of Progressive Democracy. Its leaders 
"feared rather than wanted to found such a world." Monetary reform was not 
even the impetus for insurgency. The G.L.P. was a broader revolt "against pol- 
itics as usual," the devaluation of citizenship, and the monopolistic threat of 
plutocracy. To illustrate his argument, Lause stresses national aspirations and 
that many insurgents joined for reasons other than currency reform. Even in the 
Midwest, the node of greenbackism, a frontier ethic of individualism and com- 
munalism, filtered through free labor ideology, was vital to appeals aimed at 
dissident Republicans. These converts expected the G.O.P. to abolish both chat- 
tel and wage slavery, and became disillusioned by the late 1870s. Instead of 
hard work and virtue bringing material rewards, the independence of producers 
was disappearing. A possible solution was an electoral realignment such as 
Republicans in the 1850s had spawned. 
Economic distress, discontent with government, and alienation from a 
Tweedle-DeeITweedle-Dum party system provided initial groundswells of sup- 
port for the new party, just as these conditions helped spawn other third party 
movements of the era. But the insurgents in 1880, according to Lause, were dif- 
ferent. They sought a permanent independent organization. They were more 
radical and became increasingly so due to an eclectic outreach to workingmen's 
and reform organizations more concerned about other issues than the debate 
over "soft" money. According to Lause, socialists were an important compo- 
nent of the G.L.P., not a fringe element. The national platform addressed cur- 
rency issues, but also included planks on woman's suffrage and public owner- 
ship of land, water, and air. And the greenback issue itself often was used as a 
vehicle to articulate broader social critiques on inequitable distribution of 
wealth. 
Lause points to Weaver's candidacy as evidence the G.L.P. was not fusion- 
ist-minded. Greenbackism made coalition with the G.O.P. unlikely. The choice 
of an ex-Republican to head the ticket was an obstacle to Democratic alliance. 
Weaver also was an ex-Union general. Selection of an ex-Confederate general 
as his running mate, according to Lause, shows the G.L.P.'s desire to overcome 
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sectionalism, avoid "bloody shirt" debates, and create a national voting base. 
Much of the book documents abortive attempts to extend the G.L.P. beyond the 
Midwest. By appealing to blacks and calling for federal intervention into the 
South, Weaver alienated local Democratic leaders. The G.L.P. lacked funds and 
ultimately succumbed to intimidation and "bulldozing." The South was aban- 
doned, yet the party intensified its independent stance. The main issue now, 
though, was not greenbackism, but frauds perpetuated by the Democratic- 
Republican Party. 
Campaigning in the Northeast also was ineffective. Weaver still criticized 
"bulldozing" in the South, but now denounced similar Republican practices in 
the North. Greenbackism increasingly became more the form than substance of 
Weaver's message. But little grassroots support was mobilized except a few 
workingmen's groups. Fusionists in Massachusetts hindered the third party. A 
Union ticket emerged in Maine, much to Weaver's chagrin. The Union slate 
won, but the G.L.P. reaped little benefit when Democrats stole the credit. A 
beleaguered G.L.P. retreated to its midwestern base. Funding evaporated amidst 
last minute charges of scandal, despite Weaver's unprecedented disclosure of 
campaign finances. Election returns provided only a fraction of anticipated 
support and the party dissolved. Other third parties, according to Lause, would 
adopt the G.L.P. style, but not its substance. In this sense, then, the Weaver 
campaign was unique. America reached a turning point, began to turn, then 
failed to do so, or at least turned in the wrong direction. 
Lause makes a plausible case. Unfortunately, the monograph suffers some- 
what due to excessive sentimentality towards its subjects and from dubious 
dogma, such as claims that history repeats itself. The author is refreshingly can- 
did on these matters. But candor does not negate the fact that his book sets out 
to illustrate a theoretical model, rather than rigorously testing it. Lause makes 
his case by overemphasizing facts which buttress his argument, and marginal- 
izing contradictory evidence. The G.L.P. was more nationally oriented, inde- 
pendent-minded, comparatively radical in membership and inclination, and was 
suppressed, in part, by two-party oppression. But this reader remains uncon- 
vinced the party was, in the end much more than a regional grassroots organi- 
zation, that fusionist elements were not important, that radical influence was 
unambiguous, or that other factors were not also responsible for its demise. 
Perhaps this lacuna is why Lause hedges his thesis with disclaimers that it con- 
tests traditional historiography. 
The G.L.P., in fact, had national aspirations. Lause is correct. Yet, here, as 
elsewhere, the author sketches the party as envisioned in the form of what it 
wanted to become, rather than what it was. While it did try to expand its base 
with a broader platform, this attempt largely failed. In the end, the G.L.P. fell 
back upon its midwestern base constituency, among whom the currency debate 
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was more salient. In fact, over two-thirds of the popular vote Weaver received 
was cast in that region (over 80% if Missouri and Kentucky returns are includ- 
ed). Lause also argues that the G.L.P. was more independent than other third 
parties. But "more" independent does not mean it was devoid of fusionist ele- 
ments. The Union slate in Maine, and less successful coalition bids elsewhere 
show a fusionist faction existed especially at local levels. Lause himself notes 
numerous individuals that abandoned the party over the fusion question during 
the campaign. Even if an independent course was pursued more analysis is 
needed to establish whether this decision was more a matter of choice or neces- 
sity. 
Lause mentions but does not develop the G.L.P.'s relationship to soft 
money Democrats, especially in the Midwest where the "Ohio Idea" was pio- 
neered. Was independence a matter of rejecting fusion, or was it due more to a 
lack of major party interest except in select localities? What is lacking is 
detailed and longitudinal examination of the issue niche in which the greenback 
debate evolved and the given context in which the two major parties prioritized 
and polarized on that question. 
LauseS study underrates the interactive nature of the independence and 
fusion tactics, as alternative options chosen upon the contingency of immedi- 
ate circumstances. Indeed, comparisons with the realignment of the 1850s 
might profitably consider the transition beginning with the Liberty Party in 
1840. That party also sought independence and met defeat. Later, alternating 
tactics, including temporary fusion with both minor and major parties, cleared 
a foundation for a new Republican Party. In each step of the process, though, 
the Liberty program was diluted. What began as a campaign to alleviate the 
plight of black Americans became concerned foremost with rights and liberties 
of white men, and hardly recognizable to the Old Guard. Perhaps a similar tra- 
jectory has application with regard to the transition from the G.L.P. to the 
advent of Populism and Progressivism. 
Lause emphasizes the centrality of radicalism, especially socialism, with- 
in the G.L.P.. Fair enough. But it also is true the radicals were not dominant. 
Lause stresses that free labor ideologues and socialists shared a common cri- 
tique of plutocracy, but also concedes disagreement existed over the role of a 
positive state. At one point, Lause contends the G.L.P. was ideologically 
diverse. Elsewhere, he condemns "comic book" versions of the past for under- 
rating radical unity. But were the radicals united and influential? Lause admits 
the Socialist Party did not abandon an independent identity, although it allowed 
members to affiliate with the G.L.P. But not all did. Some socialists viewed 
Weaver as a well-meaning, but misguided "brother," whereas some of them 
actually actively opposed the G.L.P. Although another group of more amenable 
socialists aided in securing radical planks in the platform, the confusing man- 
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ner of their adoption made it possible for party spokesmen to ignore, waffle, or 
selectively interpret their meaning on the stump and in the press. To determine 
the relative clout of radicals, additional scholarship will need to apply more rig- 
orous methods and scrutinize a broader range of sources. 
Perhaps a broader sampling of the third party press might prove useful. 
Quantitative analysis of the background characteristics of convention delegates 
might also provide insights unattainable at present through anecdotal biogra- 
phical sketches and summaries of proceedings alone. Based on Lause's 
account, one might suppose the G.L.P. was misnamed, and should have been 
called the Labor-Greenback Party. Yet even the author concedes the most pow- 
erful faction, throughout the third party 'S short lifespan, was the "pragmatists," 
even if radical influence fluctuated and was magnified somewhat over time. 
Finally, one must question whether political repression alone was respon- 
sible for the G.L.P.'s collapse. After all, despite an independent vote of 1.6 mil- 
lion ballots in 1876, the third party in 1880 polled only a little over 300,000 
votes. Either the insurgency was miniscule and class struggle rather mute or, as 
Lause claims, the two major parties circumvented mobilization of the masses. 
Claims of bulldozing have merit, but such charges also were, in part, a face- 
saving gesture to explain abandoning efforts in areas where insurgency simply 
failed to woo support or funds. Lause argues for a declension in G.L.P. south- 
ern support, but one wonders what threshold ever existed to decline from. The 
G.L.P., moreover, may have committed tactical errors and blunders that also 
hastened their demise. 
For instance, Lause claims appeals to northern white wage earners neces- 
sitated that the party support black voting and women's suffrage. Yet, was such 
a course of action mandated? Republicans in the 1850s managed to combine 
appeals for white working class support in the North with minimal commitment 
to civil and political rights for blacks or females. The G.L.P. may have appealed 
to all classes initially to test the waters before focusing their message more nar- 
rowly at receptive audiences. Lause concedes black voters cast ballots in the 
South during the late 1870s and actually makes the confusing claim that the 
G.L.P. cracked the solid South before it was solid. It seems, then, that leaders 
opted to court black voters rather than having it forced on them. In any case, 
the debate between legitimist and purist within party ranks is left somewhat 
ambiguous in this study, other than coverage of the fusion issue. Even in the 
North, moreover, oppression was not always the preferred tactic of major par- 
ties. In some states, Democrats were amenable to fusion. G.L.P. independence 
and radicalism may have actually hurt the party among its core support in the 
Midwest. Lause, however, fails to provide any quantitative analysis of the 
G.L.P.'s social base, compare it to groups with similar demographic profiles, 
and thereby begin to ascertain how much potential greenback support was lost 
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due to rigid adherence to independence, a broad platform, and rejection of 
fusion. 
Part of the problem is a stylistic choice to let the insurgents "speak for 
themselves." The approach minimizes distortion of their collective message. It 
becomes somewhat of a liability when analyzing the dynamics of party com- 
petition. Explanations for the G.L.P.'s failure are drawn almost solely from its 
adherents, and focus on mudslinging and bulldozing. Lause argues "context" 
over "partisanship," yet his own narrative indicates the latter was important. In 
a footnote, he relates that cultural regimentation also arrested the turn to social- 
ism. If he means it supplemented political oppression, which appears the case, 
then perhaps partisanship was important after all. Cultural regimentation also 
featured socialization into party subcultures. Maybe entrenched partisanship 
was a major obstacle for the G.L.P. In the South, for example, he attributes 
Democratic hostility to racism. While this factor was important, partisanship is 
also pertinent to explaining Democratic antagonism towards threats to its 
powerbase. Indeed, ritualistic behavior displayed at the unity convention indi- 
cates even the G.L.P. was not entirely free from the trappings of broader tradi- 
tional partisan cultures. 
Lause is rightly skeptical of pronouncements by victors, and his study is a 
valuable corrective to earlier treatments which overemphasized fusionist ten- 
dencies. Yet, the thesis is overdrawn, and thereby skews the third party profile 
towards radicalism, albeit an influential faction within the G.L.P., but not nec- 
essarily its defining element. Despite its national aspirations and desire to 
realign the electoral system, the G.L.P. achieved neither objective, nor is its 
demise necessarily traceable only to overt political repression. Indeed, its rise 
and fall may actually have contributed to spawning more fusionist-oriented par- 
ties in the future that sought to avoid its fate. A disjuncture may have occurred 
in 1880, but there may be more to the case for continuity than Lause concedes. 
Tom L. Franzmann 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
Kenneth Warren, Big Steel: The First Century of the United States Steel 
Corporation, 1901 -2001 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 200 1). 
Kenneth Warren has written what will probably be seen as the definitive histo- 
ry of US Steel, or at least of its first 100 years. This is a book that is compre- 
hensive, detailed and, despite being heavily based on documents from US Steel 
